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Abstract
This paper shows that a city where both a congestion externality and an externality from
greenhouse gas emissions are corrected by efficient policies is more compact than the laissez-
faire equilibrium city. Motivated by recent empirical studies showing a positive relationship
between population density and vehicle fuel-efficiency, the consumer is assumed to choose
vehicle fuel-efficiency jointly with housing consumption and residential location. By incor-
porating the consumer’s vehicle choice into the urban spatial model, we can represent the
total amount of vehicle emissions released by the city residents. We first establish the well-
known result that the congestion externality as a source of market failure is associated with
excessive urban sprawl. We then show that vehicle emissions are an additional source of
market failure, which also leads to excessive urban sprawl. The source of excessive sprawl
arising from the emission externality is the use of larger and less-fuel efficient vehicles in
more sprawled cities, which is different from that of the congestion externality. We also ana-
lyze the effect of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards on urban spatial
structure and its efficacy as a second-best tool for correcting the emission externality.
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1 Introduction
The phenomenon of urban sprawl, which characterizes the land development pattern in
the US since 1950, has become a major concern for policymakers in many countries, espe-
cially in the US. While the standard urban model suggests that cities’ spatial expansion is
a natural consequence of changes in several fundamental economic forces,1 the expansion
may be excessive compared to the socially desirable level. Specifically, cities’ spatial expan-
sion is excessive when the operation of sprawl-inducing forces involves market failures or
equivalently when the urban developer fails to fully account for the social cost of suburban
development (Brueckner (2000; 2001), Brueckner and Helsley (2011)).
Among other sources, traffic congestion is the most studied source of market failures
associated with urban sprawl.2 With unpriced traffic congestion, the social cost of commuting
exceeds the private cost because every driver on the road slows down other drivers while this
external congestion cost is ignored by himself. Commute trips are thus excessively long,
and the market equilibrium would generate the city that is too spread out compared to the
socially desirable level. Consistent with this intuition, the congested-city models suggest
that a city where congestion externalities are internalized by congestion tolls is denser and
spatially smaller than the other city where congestion externalities are left uncorrected (e.g.,
Arnott (1979), Wheaton (1998), Brueckner (2007)).
While traffic congestion is a widely-recognized vehicle-related externality leading to ex-
cessive urban sprawl, there are also other kinds of vehicle-related externalities in the urban
economy. These externalities include global air pollution (especially greenhouse gas emis-
sions), local air pollution, the country’s oil dependence, and traffic accidents (Parry et al.
(2007)). Like congestion externalities, these kinds of externalities, especially air pollution,
1The fundamental forces leading to urban spatial growth include rising incomes, lowered transport cost,
and falling agricultural rents (Wheaton (1974), Brueckner (1987)).
2For example, Wheaton (1998) and Brueckner (2007) investigate the effect of traffic congestion in a
closed-city model. Anas and Pines (2008) extend the analysis to a system of congested cities. Beside traffic
congestion, other sources of market failure leading to excessive sprawl of urban areas include the failure to
account for the amenity value of open space and the failure to fully account for the social cost of infrastructure
development (Brueckner (2000; 2001), Brueckner and Helsley (2011)).
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are also potentially related to the phenomenon of urban sprawl because longer commutes
and increased passenger vehicle travels induced by low-density suburban development would
mean greater air pollution released by the city residents. This hypothesis is supported by
a number of empirical papers, which find that lower population density of the resident’s
neighborhood increases vehicle mileage traveled and energy consumption (e.g., Boarnet and
Crane (2001), Bento et al. (2005), Brownstone and Golob (2009), Kim and Brownstone
(2013)). Moreover, the increased vehicle travels are responsible for a significant portion of
the increased greenhouse gas emissions (Glaeser and Kahn (2010), Glaeser (2011)). There-
fore, according to these empirical papers, real-world cities are too spread out in the sense
that such sprawled cities emit too much air pollution.3 While vehicle emissions have been
recognized as an important source of urban externalities in the empirical studies, urban eco-
nomic models analyzing this kind of externality are relatively rare compared to the large
literature on urban traffic congestion.4 This paper fills this gap by analyzing both the con-
gestion and the emission externalities in an urban economic model framework to ask whether
the optimal city is more compact than the laissez-faire city.
We treat vehicle fuel-efficiency as a key variable in analyzing the emission externality
because vehicle fuel-efficiency (or vehicle size and weight) chosen by the city residents is a
key determinant of the city’s emission level. Specifically, the city’s emission amount will be
greater as the consumers choose bigger and less-fuel efficient vehicles, holding their vehicle
utilization levels fixed.5 Indeed, vehicle fuel-efficiency has been recognized as an important
policy target by the government in its goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. For ex-
3While a majority of urban economists are in favor of high density, based on the empirical effect of density
on the environment (e.g., Glaeser (2011)), Gaigne´, Riou, and Thisse (2012) argue that this conclusion is not
always true if the general equilibrium effect of firms’ and consumers’ location choices on the emission level
is taken into account.
4An exception is Riley (1974), who considers local pollution and its interaction with traffic congestion. A
recent paper by Hirte and Tscharaktschiew (2010) also investigates the effect of congestion tolls and emission
charges on urban spatial structure in a polycentric city model framework, relying on numerical simulations.
5Fatal traffic accidents are another example of vehicle externalities that are greater as the consumer’s
vehicle size is greater. There is recent empirical evidence that the probability of committing a fatal traffic
accident is significantly greater for heavier and larger vehicles (Anderson and Auffhammer (2014), Van
Ommeren et al. (2013)).
3
ample, the US government has been implementing various energy policies for vehicles, such
as fuel taxes, vehicle fuel-efficiency standards, and financial subsidies and penalties for the
purchase of high- and low- efficiency vehicles.6 Along the same lines, we also treat vehicle
fuel-efficiency as a key variable in analyzing vehicle emission externalities.
There is another group of relevant empirical studies that motivate us to treat vehicle
fuel-efficiency as a key variable. These empirical papers suggest that consumers’ vehicle
fuel-efficiency choices (or emissions per vehicle) interact with their location and housing
consumption choices. Specifically, consumers residing in less-dense suburban areas tend to
choose less fuel-efficient vehicles than those located in denser areas, controlling for the con-
sumers’ other aspects such as incomes (Brownstone and Golob (2009), Kim and Brownstone
(2013)).7 According to these papers, consumers living in lower-density neighborhoods tend
to emit disproportionate air pollution because they not only drive more but also choose less
fuel-efficient vehicles. This suggests that urban expansion will be inefficient unless vehicle
emission externalities are corrected by efficient policies.
Our model provides a theoretical framework to see whether this intuition is correct. In
the model, the consumer is assumed to choose vehicle fuel-efficiency jointly with housing
consumption, conditional on her residential location, and as a result, the empirical rela-
tionship between population density and vehicle fuel-efficiency emerges in equilibrium.8 By
endogenizing consumers’ vehicle fuel-efficiency choices in this way, we are able to represent
the total amount of vehicle emissions released by the city residents. The city’s total vehicle
emission is proportional to the residents’ aggregate fuel consumption, more accurately to
the weighted summation of residents’ commute distances with weights set at vehicle sizes
6See Small (2012) for discussion of the costs and effectiveness of these energy policies.
7Similar vehicle-choice patterns are found in West (2004) and Fang (2008). Note that these studies
indicate a negative relationship between fuel efficiency and vehicle usage when these variables are interacted
with residential density. But, holding residential density fixed, improved fuel efficiency may cause additional
travel by reducing the monetary cost of travel. Researchers have long estimated this “rebound-effect” (e.g.,
Small and Van Dender (2007)).
8Kim (2012) also considers a similar framework, where the consumer chooses vehicle size jointly with
housing consumption. But, there is no efficiency analysis in Kim (2012) while it is the main focus of this
paper.
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(capturing fuel-inefficiency). After analyzing the consumer’s problem, we next turn to the
social planner’s problem to investigate how the social planner’s choices are different from the
consumers’ choices.
We first establish that a city where congestion externalities are internalized via appro-
priate congestion tolls is more compact than the laissez-faire city. We then incorporate the
vehicle emission externality into the model to see how the result would be modified. We
show that under the presence of both congestion and emission externalities, the optimal
city, where both kinds of externalities are corrected by efficient policies, is more compact
than the city where the externalities are left uncorrected. The sprawl effect of the emission
externality does not rely on the effect of the congestion externality, which implies that the
emission externality is an independent source of market failures leading to excessive urban
sprawl. While both the congestion and the emission externalities are associated with exces-
sive urban sprawl, the source of this outcome is different between the two cases. Under traffic
congestion, urban sprawl is undesirable because longer commute distances induced by urban
sprawl generate more external congestion costs. Meanwhile, under emission externalities,
urban sprawl is undesirable because residents in more sprawled cities tend to use excessively
larger and less-fuel efficient vehicles, emitting disproportionate air pollution.
In our model, the first-best optimal policy for correcting the emission externality is
vehicle fuel taxes. But, we also analyze the effect of an alternative vehicle fuel-efficiency
regulation, in particular Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in the US, on
the variables of interest including land-use patterns, emission levels, the consumer welfare.
The analysis shows that the CAFE regulation reduces the city’s spatial size and increases
consumer welfare from the laissez-faire equilibrium, but not by as much as the first-best
optimal fuel taxes. There have been many papers to evaluate the efficiency implications of
various second-best anti-sprawl policies.9 However, the emission externality is additionally
considered in our paper, and therefore this is to best of our knowledge the first attempt to
9For example, Bento et al. (2006) compare the effects of various policies such as urban growth boundaries,
development taxes, property taxes, and fuel taxes on efficiency and on land-use patterns.
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evaluate the effect of the CAFE regulation as a second-best anti-sprawl policy in a spatial
framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes the model and ana-
lyzes the laissez-faire equilibrium. Section 3 analyzes the central planner’s problem to show
whether traffic congestion and vehicle emissions are sprawl-inducing externalities. Section 4
characterizes the equilibrium under the policy of the CAFE standards. Section 5 provides
numerical examples of various policy regimes to numerically investigate the effects of various
policies. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The setup
We adopt a variant of the simple two-zone city framework that is also used in Brueckner
and Helsley (2011). The city is monocentric and has two zones: central zone, denoted by
c, and suburban zone, denoted by s. Land area of the central zone is normalized to unity.
The suburban zone is comprised of developed land and potentially developable open space.
There is the central business district (CBD) at the left end of the city. The central residents
must cross the central bridge while the suburban residents must cross both the central bridge
and the suburban bridge to reach the CBD. The two bridges have the same length and are
congestible. Figure 1 shows the regional map of the city. The city is closed, which means
that the city’s total population is exogenously fixed.
[Figure 1 about here]
Only passenger vehicle travel is available for the city residents. For simplicity, commuting
cost within a zone is assumed to be zero while the cost for crossing a bridge is positive. So,
residents within a zone are homogeneous while central- and suburban- residents differ by the
number of bridges they cross.
Commuting costs (costs for crossing the bridges) are comprised of congestion-unrelated
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costs, denoted by f , and congestion costs, denoted by I. The congestion-unrelated cost (f)
is monetary fuel cost that is proportional to distance traveled. The consumer’s choice of f is
equivalent to her choice of vehicle size because larger vehicles are typically less fuel-efficient
and therefore are more costly. So, f indicates fuel-inefficiency, and we often call f vehicle
size below.10
The congestion cost (I) captures driving inconvenience and time cost associated with
traffic congestion. I also captures part of fuel costs wasted due to traffic congestion. Follow-
ing an approach similar to that of Kim (2012), congestion cost (I) is assumed to depend on
f and Q, where f captures vehicle size and Q is traffic flows on a bridge.11 Congestion costs
are assumed to be higher as traffic flows are higher, so that ∂I/∂Q > 0. Also, ∂I/∂f < 0
holds, because a larger car offers a greater driving convenience for a given level of traffic
flows, but at a diminishing rate, so that ∂2I/∂f 2 > 0. But as roads become congested,
this advantage of large cars lessens because of the difficulty of maneuvering in heavy traf-
fic, so that ∂2I/∂f∂Q > 0 (making ∂I/∂f less negative). This cross-partial derivative also
indicates that ∂I/∂Q increases with vehicle size f , which means that additional fuel costs
wasted due to congestion are higher as the vehicle gets larger and less fuel-efficient.
To summarize, it is assumed that I = I(f,Q), with ∂I/∂Q > 0, ∂I/∂f < 0, ∂2I/∂f 2 > 0,
and ∂2I/∂f∂Q > 0. Under the maintained assumptions, the central commuter’s total annual
10In effect, we are assuming that the cars in the two zones have the same fixed cost (cost for purchasing
a vehicle, which is normalized to zero) but only differ in fuel efficiency and thus in operating cost. If capital
cost were considered, the congestion-unrelated cost (f) would be less than proportional to distance traveled,
so the coefficient on fs in (2) would be smaller than 2. But, it can be shown that the results of the paper,
notably Lemma 1, would be unchanged with this modification. It is more straightforward in the subsequent
analysis to focus on the operating cost of travel, which is proportional to distance traveled and to vehicle
fuel-efficiency.
11Kim (2012) introduces a similar form of commuting cost, but his version of congestion cost is driving
inconvenience that depends on population density instead of traffic flows. Anas and Hiramatsu (2012)’s
commuting-cost formulation is also similar to ours. However, instead of being comprised of congestion and
congestion-unrelated costs, their commuting cost is composed of monetary and time-cost parts. Like the
congestion-cost component in our formulation, they assume non-separability of travel speed and vehicle size
in the monetary cost component, so the interaction effect of travel speed and vehicle size on commuting cost
exists.
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commuting cost, denoted by tc, is given by
tc = fc + I(fc, N), (1)
where fc denotes the central resident’s choice of f and N denotes the total population in the
city. Note that the traffic flow on the central bridge is N because all residents (including
both the central residents and the suburban residents) cross that bridge.
For the suburban resident, who travels twice as far as the central resident, the congestion-
unrelated cost (i.e., cost that is proportional to distance traveled) is 2fs, where fs represents
vehicle size chosen by the suburban resident. Recognizing the different levels of traffic on the
two bridges, the total congestion cost for the suburban resident is given by I(fs, N)+I(fs, ns),
where ns denotes the number of suburban residents, i.e., the traffic flow on the suburban
bridge. Summing up, the suburban commuter’s total annual commuting cost, denoted by ts,
is given by
ts = 2fs + I(fs, N) + I(fs, ns). (2)
Consumer preferences depend on housing consumption, denoted q, and consumption of a
non-housing composite good, denoted e. For analytical tractability, preferences are assumed
to be quasi-linear, with the utility function given by u = e+ v(q), where v′ > 0 and v′′ < 0.
All consumers earn incomes of y by commuting to the CBD. Letting pi denote the price per
unit of housing in zone i (3 {c, s}), the budget constraint of a consumer in zone i is given
by ei + piqi = y− ti, where lower subscripts imply the choice made by the consumer in zone
i and where the price of the non-housing good (e) is normalized to unity. By substituting ec
from the budget constraint into the utility function, we write the central resident’s utility,
denoted by uc, as follows:
uc = y − fc − I(fc, N)− pcqc + v(qc). (3)
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In the same way, the suburban resident’s utility is written
us = y − 2fs − I(fs, N)− I(fs, ns)− psqs + v(qs). (4)
Note that housing production is suppressed in our model, so that housing consumption is
equivalent to land consumption.
2.2 The laissez-faire equilibrium
The consumer in the central zone maximizes (3) by choices of qc and fc. The first-order
condition for choice of qc is
v′(qc) = pc, (5)
and the first-order condition for fc is
1 +
∂I(fc, N)
∂fc
= 0. (6)
In the same manner, the suburban resident maximizes (4) by choices of qs and fs, and the
first-order condition for qs is given by v
′(qs) = ps. But, the usual condition is that land rent
at the edge of the city must equal an exogenous agricultural rent, p¯, so that ps = p¯. The
first-order condition for qs is then written
v′(qs) = p¯. (7)
The first-order condition for fs is
2 +
∂I(fs, N)
∂fs
+
∂I(fs, ns)
∂fs
= 0. (8)
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Next, for spatial equilibrium, the consumers in the city must achieve a common utility level
regardless of their location (zones). By setting (3) equal (4), this condition is written
v(qc)− pcqc − [fc + I(fc, N)] = v(qs)− p¯qs − [2fs + I(fs, N) + I(fs, ns)] . (9)
The final equilibrium condition requires that the population fit inside the city. Letting nc
denote the number of central residents, this condition is written N = nc + ns, where N is
the exogenous city population. The total land consumption in the central zone is ncqc, and
using the assumption that the central zone’s land area is unity, it follows that nc = 1/qc.
Thus, the population condition is rewritten
ns = N − 1/qc. (10)
Equations (5)-(10) determine the equilibrium values for qc, qs, fc, fs, pc, and ns.
The key properties of the laissez-faire equilibrium are summarized in Lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 1 Vehicle size is smaller (vehicle fuel-efficiency is higher) in the central zone than
in the suburban zone, so that fc < fs.
Proof. Suppose fc ≥ fs. Then, 1 + ∂I(fs,N)∂fs ≤ 1 +
∂I(fc,N)
∂fc
holds, given ∂2I/∂f 2 > 0. As
a result, 1 + ∂I(fs,N)
∂fs
≤ 0 holds, given 1 + ∂I(fc,N)
∂fc
= 0 from (6). Also, manipulation of
(8) yields −1 − ∂I(fs,ns)
∂fs
= 1 + ∂I(fs,N)
∂fs
, and from this equality and using 1 + ∂I(fs,N)
∂fs
≤ 0,
−1 − ∂I(fs,ns)
∂fs
≤ 0 follows. The inequality, −1 − ∂I(fs,ns)
∂fs
≤ 0, is rewritten using (6) as
−1 − ∂I(fs,ns)
∂fs
≤ 0 = −1 − ∂I(fc,N)
∂fc
. As a result, ∂I(fs,ns)
∂fs
≥ ∂I(fc,N)
∂fc
holds, which is however
is impossible given fc ≥ fs, N > ns, ∂2I/∂f 2 > 0, and ∂2I/∂f∂Q > 0. So, fc ≥ fs is
impossible, implying fc < fs.
Lemma 2 The housing price is higher and housing consumption is lower in the central zone
than in the suburban zone, so that pc > p¯ and qc < qs.
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Proof. First, note that tc < ts holds. To see this point, the fact that fc minimizes fc +
I(fc, N) means fc + I(fc, N) ≤ fs + I(fs, N). It then follows that tc = fc + I(fc, N) ≤
fs + I(fs, N) < 2fs + I(fs, N) + I(fs, ns) = ts. With tc < ts, v(qc)− pcqc < v(qs)− p¯qs holds
from (9). Letting g(p) ≡ v(q)− pq, g′(p) = (v′(q)− p)(∂q/∂p)− q = −q < 0 holds both at qc
and qs using (5) and (7). So, for v(qc)− pcqc < v(qs)− p¯qs to hold, pc > p¯ must hold. Given
v′′(q) < 0 and using (5) and (7), qc < qs follows.
Since the suburban resident’s commuting cost is higher (tc < ts), the consumer should
be compensated by a lower housing price to be equally well-off, the same principle as in the
standard model. But, the current model has the additional vehicle choice pattern shown in
Lemma 1. Note that qc < qs means a higher population density in the central zone than
in the suburban zone. So, fc < fs along with qc < qs capture the empirical vehicle choice
pattern, i.e., larger vehicles for households residing in the less-dense suburban area.
2.2.1 Discussion on relationship between residential location and vehicle choice
There can be several sources of the relationship between vehicle size and residential loca-
tion. Among others, our model suggests the congestion (speed) effect on vehicle choices as its
main source. We exploit an engineering relationship between fuel efficiency and congestion,
particularly an observation that a car consumes more fuel per distance as the congestion
level gets higher (as the speed falls).12 This observation would imply that fuel waste due to
congestion is bigger for a larger and less fuel-efficient car than for a smaller car, motivating
us to assume ∂2I/∂f∂Q > 0. Since a larger car gets more costly as congestion gets severe
(as speed falls), consumers suffering from severe congestion will choose a more fuel-efficient
vehicle, while a larger vehicle is more suitable for travelers experiencing lower congestion,
12Anas and Hiramatsu (2012)’s commuting cost incorporates a more general U-shaped relationship be-
tween fuel-inefficiency (gasoline consumption per mile) and the speed of travel, motivated by Barth and
Boriboonsomsin (2008) and Davis and Diegel (2004). While an engineering relationship indicates that fuel
costs per mile increase with speed when speed is beyond a certain level, our commuting cost does not have
this property. The underlying assumption is that drivers do not waste fuel, and more specifically, that
drivers, even when the road is not congested, do not increase speed to the level where fuel efficiency begins
to fall.
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with a higher speed.
In our spatial framework, only the suburban resident crosses both bridges for commuting,
and therefore she takes the traffic condition of the less-congested suburban bridge as well as
that of the central bridge into account in choosing a car. As a result, given the suitability of
a larger car for the less-congested suburban bridge, the suburban resident chooses a larger
vehicle than the central resident. In other words, the suburban resident chooses a larger car
because she experiences a lower level of congestion, or equivalently a higher average speed
on the commute route. Thus, in our model, the heterogeneity in the average commute speed
explains the relationship between vehicle choice and residential location.
We can verify this argument in a different perspective. In particular, we carry out a
comparative static analysis of vehicle size (f) with respect to population (N) to see how ve-
hicles sizes differ in cities with different overall levels of congestion (speed). The comparative
static derivation shown in Appendix A indicates that increased population (corresponding
to a lower speed both for the central and the suburban residents) induces a fall in both fc
and fs. This result is due to the congestion (speed) effect, which leads consumers in a city
with a higher overall level of congestion (lower speed) to choose a more fuel-efficient car.
While the suburban resident experiences a higher average speed, the suburban resident
also travels a longer distance and therefore meets more traffic and consumes more fuel in
total than the central resident. So, in reality, holding the speed of travel fixed, consumers
with a longer commute distance might tend to economize on fuel consumption by choosing a
smaller car. However, the heterogeneity in commute distance, setting aside the speed effect,
plays no role in explaining the vehicle choice pattern in our model.
To explain why, note first that while the consumer takes the additional fuel cost of a
larger car into account in choosing a car, the consumer also takes the benefit of a larger car
into account. In our commuting cost, while f (fuel cost) rises with the car size, I(f,Q) falls
with f , which implies that there are both a cost and a benefit involved with a larger f . At
the optimum, the marginal cost of f equals its marginal benefit (see (6) and (8)). Moreover,
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we can see from (6) and (8) that, if the travel speed were held fixed on the two bridges, the
first-order conditions for f would effectively be the same for the central- and the suburban
residents, which implies that the f choices would be invariant to the distance traveled if the
speed were held fixed.13 Since both the marginal cost and the marginal benefit of a higher f
are proportional to the distance traveled, the distance effects on them cancel and thus have
no net effect.14
To incorporate a distance effect on vehicle choices, more general preferences would have
to be used. For example, we could use a general quasi-concave utility function, u(y − f −
pq, q, I(f,Q)), where I(f,Q) is entered as a separate component of utility while f is directly
subtracted from consumption. Given u11 < 0, the marginal decrease in utility from a higher
f will depend on distance (i.e., whether f is multiplied by 1 or 2), which would generate
the force that we expect regarding the distance effect. While this alternative formulation
will have an advantage of generating various vehicle-choice patterns with various sets of
parameters used, the preferences that we use allow various analytic outcomes in the paper.
We leave the use of more general preferences for future work.
In addition to the distance effect, we could also incorporate the income effect and allow
income heterogeneity. We could then generate various equilibrium configurations regarding
the location and vehicle choices patterns with various parameters used. However, we again
leave this extension for future work in part because the empirical studies motivating us also
controls for the household income. Our goal in this paper is to investigate the implications
of the vehicle choice pattern for the urban economy and the environment rather than to
provide more comprehensive explanations for the pattern.
13Assume for example that the traffic is not up to the level where congestion arises, so it continues to
move at the speed limit on both bridges. Since the congestion cost I(f,Q) is invariant to Q for this level of
traffic, we can effectively set N = ns in (6) and (8). Since the first-order conditions are then the same, we
have fc = fs.
14The marginal cost of a higher f for the suburban resident is 2 and that for the central resident is 1.
The marginal benefit of a higher f for the suburban resident is 2∂I/∂f , which, holding the speed fixed, is
also twice of that for the central resident (i.e., ∂I/∂f).
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3 Sprawl-inducing externalities and effects of correc-
tive policies
In this section, we investigate how the laissez-faire equilibrium diverges from the social
optimum. To find the social optimum, we consider a problem that would be solved by
the social planner and compare the resulting socially optimal values to the laissez-faire
equilibrium values. We first investigate the case where only the congestion externality exists.
We then add the vehicle emission externality to the model.
3.1 Congestion externalities and the effect of congestion toll
The planner’s problem we consider is a utility maximization problem and is written15
max
{u,qc,qs,fc,fs,ns}
Nu (11)
s.t. (i) (N − ns)qc = 1,
(ii) (N − ns)(u− v(qc)) + ns(u− v(qs)) + ((N − ns)qc + nsqs)p¯
+(N − ns)(fc + I(fc, N)) + ns(2fs + I(fs, N) + I(fs, ns)) = Ny.
The constraint (i) is the condition requiring that land area of the central zone is fixed at
unity, where the population constraint, nc = N − ns, has been substituted. The constraint
(ii) is the aggregate income constraint, where ei = u−v(qi) (i 3 {c, s}) are substituted. Note
also that this formulation assumes that toll revenues are returned in lump-sum fashion and
that aggregate land rent also comes back as income. As a result, only the land’s opportunity
cost must be paid, and tolls do not show up in the income constraint.
15The previous version of this paper considered a resource-cost-minimization problem. The resource-cost-
minimization framework generates the same optimal choices as for the utility maximization problem. See
also Brueckner and Helsley (2011), who also adopted the resource-cost-minimization approach.
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The Lagrangian expression for the maximization problems is
L = Nu+ ρ [1− (N − ns)qc]
+λ[Ny − (N − ns)(u− v(qc))− ns(u− v(qs))− ((N − ns)qc + nsqs)p¯
−(N − ns)(fc + I(fc, N))− ns(2fs + I(fs, N) + I(fs, ns))]. (12)
The choice variables are u, qc, qs, fc, fs, and ns. The first-order condition for u yields λ = 1.
Using λ = 1, the first-order conditions for the q variables are given by
v′(qc) = p¯+ ρ, v′(qs) = p¯ (13)
The first-order conditions for fc and fs are the same as those of the laissez-faire equilibrium
(see (6) and (8)).
While the laissez-faire equilibrium value of ns is determined by the equal-utility condition
(see (9)), the choice for ns is explicitly considered by the social planner. The first-order
condition for ns is written
v(qc)− (p¯+ ρ) qc − [fc + I(fc, N)] = v(qs)− p¯qs − [2fs + I(fs, N) + I(fs, ns)]− ns∂I(fs, ns)
∂ns
.(14)
We can see that (14) is almost identical to the laissez-faire equal-utility condition, (9), except
for the presence of p¯+ ρ in place of pc and the subtraction of ns
∂I(fs,ns)
∂ns
on the RHS in (14).
To find the socially optimal values, p¯+ρ, interpreted as the shadow price of a housing in the
central zone, is set at its socially optimal value, denoted by p∗c . The socially optimal value
for qc, denoted by q
∗
c , is then recovered, since p
∗
c is associated with q
∗
c via p
∗
c = v
′(q∗c ). Under
this interpretation and rewriting (14), the socially optimal values satisfy
v(q∗c )− v′(q∗c )q∗c − v(q∗s) + p¯q∗s = −t∗s + t∗c − n∗s
∂I(f ∗s , n
∗
s)
∂ns
, (15)
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where the superscript ∗ denotes the optimal values and t∗s = 2f
∗
s + I(f
∗
s , N) + I(f
∗
s , n
∗
s) and
t∗c = f
∗
c + I(f
∗
c , N).
Letting ̂ denote the laissez-faire equilibrium values, the equal-utility condition (9) is
rewritten as
v(q̂c)− v′(q̂c)q̂c − v(q̂s) + p¯q̂s = −t̂s + t̂c, (16)
where t̂s = 2f̂s + I(f̂s, N) + I(f̂s, n̂s) and t̂c = f̂c + I(f̂c, N). Note that suburban housing
consumption qs is the same in both cases from v
′(q∗s) = v
′(q̂s) = p¯. Also, since the first-order
conditions for fc are identical in both cases, given the common N , f̂c = f
∗
c and thus t
∗
c = t̂c
holds. For the remaining variables, we compare (15) and (16) to see the differences in the
optimal and the laissez-faire equilibrium values. The results are summarized as follows:
Proposition 1 n∗s < n̂s holds, meaning that there are too many suburban residents at the
laissez-faire equilibrium, compared to the socially optimal level. Also, q∗c < q̂c and p
∗
c > p̂c
hold. Finally, while f ∗c = f̂c holds, the optimal vehicle size is larger than the laissez-faire
equilibrium level in the suburban zone, so that f ∗s > f̂s.
Proof. Suppose n∗s ≥ n̂s. Then, q∗c ≥ q̂c holds given ns = N − 1/qc. Since v(q) − v′(q)q is
increasing in q (the derivative of the expression is −v′′(q)q > 0), the LHS of (15) is greater
than (or equal to) the LHS of (16), given q∗s = q̂s. Therefore, the RHS of (15) must also be
greater than (or equal to) the RHS of (16) . Given −n∗s ∂I(f
∗
s ,n
∗
s)
∂ns
< 0 and t∗c = t̂c, t
∗
s < t̂s
must then hold. But, note that ∂t
∗
s
∂ns
= n∗s
∂I(f∗s ,n∗s)
∂ns
> 0 holds by the envelope theorem. Then,
given n∗s ≥ n̂s, t∗s ≥ t̂s follows, which is contradictory. Thus, we can rule out n∗s ≥ n̂s, so
that n∗s < n̂s holds. Then, q
∗
c < q̂c follows given ns = N − 1/qc, and p∗c > p̂c holds given
v′(qc) = pc and v′′ < 0. Finally, to compare fs values, total differentiation of (8) and the
maintained assumptions on I imply ∂fs/∂ns < 0. Since fs is solely determined by ns given
the exogeneity of N , f ∗s > f̂s follows from n
∗
s < n̂s.
Since commuters do not account for the external costs imposed on other drivers, there
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is too much traffic on the suburban bridge, and equivalently there is too large a suburban
population at the laissez-faire equilibrium. So, congestion tolls should be imposed to capture
the commuters’ external congestion costs. The above analysis shows that imposition of
the appropriate congestion toll, whose amount is n∗s
∂I(f∗s ,n∗s)
∂ns
for each resident, shifts the
suburban population to the central zone and population density in the central zone increases
in response.16 With this toll subtracted from the RHS of (16), the conditions (16) and (14)
become equivalent so that the equilibrium in the presence of the toll is social optimum.
Note also that 1 + q∗sn
∗
s < 1 + q̂sn̂s holds, given q
∗
s = q̂s, n
∗
s < n̂s, and qcnc = 1. This
means that the optimal city is spatially smaller than the laissez-faire city. Observe also that
imposition of the congestion toll influences the suburban resident’s vehicle size, fs, via the
effect on ns. In particular, with the smaller suburban population and the reduced traffic flow
on the suburban bridge, the suburban residents choose larger vehicles at the optimum than
at the laissez-faire equilibrium. The central resident’s vehicle size, fc, is unchanged since the
traffic flow on the central bridge is fixed at N regardless of congestion tolling.
3.2 Adding vehicle emission externalities
We now assume that city residents care about the level of air pollution in the city.
Specifically, the utility function for the consumer in zone i (3 {c, s}) is modified to ui =
ei+v(qi)−z(E), where E represents the total vehicle emissions released by all city residents,
with z′(E) > 0, so that greater vehicle emissions reduce the consumer’s utility. Note that
E does not involve a subscript, which means that city residents are equally affected by air
pollution regardless of their locations.17 An emission externality exists because individual
consumers ignore the effect of their location and vehicle fuel-efficiency choices on the city’s
emission level.
16Imposition of the congestion toll is actually equivalent to regulating lot size or population density
(Wheaton (1998)).
17We could instead introduce local air pollution that varies by zone, but it would not change the main
results of the paper. We instead refer to Riley (1974), who considers local air pollution in a similar framework
but without explicit vehicle-size choices and finds some ambiguous outcomes regarding the optimal and
laissez-faire population densities.
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The emission amount will be proportional to the total fuel consumption in the city. Total
fuel consumption will depend on the number of residents in each zone, fuel-efficiency of each
vehicle, and distance traveled by each vehicle. In particular, we model the total vehicle
emissions in the city as
E ≡ ncfc + βnsfs, (17)
where β represents distance-related extra emissions of suburban vehicles, with β ≥ 1. If
there were no traffic congestion, emissions released by a car would simply be proportional
to distance traveled, controlling for the car’s fuel-efficiency, in which case β = 2 would hold.
But, when congestion is considered, the additional emissions generated by the suburban
vehicle would be less than proportional to the distance traveled, because only suburban
vehicles cross the less-congested suburban bridge and the lower congestion would correspond
to a less pollution per vehicle on the bridge, in which case β < 2 would hold. An implicit
assumption is that lower driving speed (more congestion) raises pollution per mile. We
assume that β can take any value between 1 and 2.18
To compare the laissez-faire equilibrium and the social optimum, note first that all the
first-order conditions in the laissez-faire equilibrium are unchanged with the modification
because E is taken as fixed in the individual consumer’s problem. The equal-utility condition,
(9), is also unchanged because z(E) enters into both sides of the equation. But, the planner’s
problem should be modified because the social planner takes the effect of her choices on the
E level into account. In particular, the social planner is assumed to solve the following
18The main result below does not rely on the value of β as long as β is greater than or equal to 1. A
β value that is less than 1 does not make sense, since it would mean a lower emission for longer distance
holding fuel-efficiency fixed.
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problem:19
max
{u,qc,qs,fc,fs,ns}
L = Nu+ ρ [1− (N − ns)qc]
+λ[Ny − (N − ns)(u− v(qc) + z((N − ns)fc + βnsfs))
−ns(u− v(qs) + z((N − ns)fc + βnsfs))− ((N − ns)qc + nsqs)p¯
−(N − ns)(fc + I(fc, N))− ns(2fs + I(fs, N) + I(fs, ns))], (18)
where (17) is used to substitute for E.
The first-order conditions for u and the q variables are the same as in the previous case
where only the congestion externality is considered. But, the first-order condition for fc is
different, being written
1 +
∂I(fc, N)
∂fc
+Nz′(E) = 0. (19)
The first-order condition for fs is given by
2 +
∂I(fs, N)
∂fs
+
∂I(fs, ns)
∂fs
+ βNz′(E) = 0. (20)
These conditions imply that the consumers should be charged vehicle fuel taxes (or emission
taxes), whose amounts are Nz′(E)fc for the central resident and βNz′(E)fs for the suburban
resident. Note thatNz′(E)fc < βNz′(E)fs holds, meaning that the suburban resident should
be charged higher fuel taxes because she consumes more fuel and thus emit more pollution
due to her longer commute trips (β ≥ 1) and lower fuel-efficiency (fc < fs).20
19Again, emission tax revenues discussed below are returned in lump-sum fashion, so they do not appear
in the budget constraint.
20The proof of fc < fs in the first-best case is as follows. Suppose fc ≥ fs. Then, 0 = 1 + ∂I(fc,N)∂fc +
Nz′(E) ≥ 1 + ∂I(fs,N)∂fs +Nz′(E) holds since
∂I(fc,N)
∂fc
≥ ∂I(fs,N)∂fs holds given ∂2I/∂f2. Using this inequality
and by manipulation of (20), we can see that 1+ ∂I(fc,N)∂fc +Nz
′(E) = 0 ≤ 1+ ∂I(fs,ns)∂fs +(−1+β)Nz′(E) must
hold, which is impossible because Nz′(E) ≥ (−1+β)Nz′(E) (since 1 ≤ β ≤ 2) and ∂I(fc,N)∂fc >
∂I(fs,ns)
∂fs
given
fc ≥ fs and N > ns and ∂2I/∂f2 > 0 and ∂2I/∂f∂Q > 0. Since fc ≥ fs is ruled out, the only possibility is
fc < fs.
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The first-order condition for ns is given by
v(qc)− (p¯+ ρ) qc − [fc + I(fc, N)]−Nz′(E)fc
= v(qs)− p¯qs − [2fs + I(fs, N) + I(fs, ns)]− ns∂I(fs, ns)
∂ns
− βNz′(E)fs. (21)
According to this condition, the optimal ns is achieved when consumers are charged both
congestion tolls and vehicle fuel taxes. As explained above, we can recover the optimal
solution chosen by the planner by setting the shadow price of a central housing at its optimal
value. Setting p∗c = p¯ + ρ = v
′(q∗c ) and rearranging (21), the optimal values, denoted by
∗,
satisfy the following:
v(q∗c )− v′(q∗c )q∗c − v(q∗s) + p¯q∗s = −t∗s + t∗c − n∗s
∂I(f ∗s , n
∗
s)
∂ns
−Nz′(E∗)(−f ∗c + βf ∗s ), (22)
where t∗s = 2f
∗
s + I(f
∗
s , N) + I(f
∗
s , n
∗
s) and t
∗
c = f
∗
c + I(f
∗
c , N).
Since the first-order conditions for qs are unchanged, q̂s = q
∗
s again holds, wherêdenotes
the laissez-faire solution. But, note that the first-order conditions for the f variables at
the optimum (see (19) and (20)) are different from those at the laissez-faire equilibrium
(see (6) and (8)), which should be incorporated for comparison. With this incorporation,
we compare (22) and (16) to see how the optimal solution diverges from the laissez-faire
equilibrium solution. The comparison results are summarized as follows:
Proposition 2 n∗s < n̂s holds, meaning that the suburban population is too large when
both the congestion and the emission externalities are uncorrected, compared to when these
externalities are corrected by the appropriate congestion tolls and vehicle fuel taxes. Also,
q∗c < q̂c and p
∗
c > p̂c hold. Finally, the optimal vehicle size in the central zone is smaller than
the laissez-faire equilibrium size, so that f ∗c < f̂c. But, the optimal suburban vehicle size may
be smaller or larger than the laissez-faire size.
Proof. See Appendix B.
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Thus, when both the congestion and the emission externalities exist, the laissez-faire city
is too spread-out compared to the optimal city, where both kinds of externalities are cor-
rected by the appropriate policies. Importantly, this result does not rely only on congestion
externalities but is due to the operation of emission externalities, implying that the emission
externality is an independent source of market failures leading to excessive sprawl. To see
this point, we isolate the effect of emission taxes on city size by comparing two cities, one
where emission externalities are corrected and the other where emission externalities are left
uncorrected, while assuming that congestion externalities are ignored and uncorrected in
both cities. To compare these cities, we simply drop the congestion toll term in (22) and
compare the equation to (16). This modification does not affect the above result, which can
be seen from the proof of Proposition 2 (see Appendix B).21 22
The effects of charging for emissions have a simple explanation. With emission taxes, the
vehicle sizes (f) tend to fall, an effect that raises t values. Note that t values are minimized
at the laissez-faire equilibrium with no emission taxes (see (6) and (8)). In addition, since
the emission taxes themselves are added, the consumers’ commuting costs increase, and the
resulting higher commuting costs cause people to move toward the center, shrinking the city.
While this story is intuitively simple, the mechanism behind this effect is fundamentally
different from that of the congestion externality. Specifically, under congestion externalities,
urban sprawl is undesirable because commuters drive excessively long distances and thus
residents in more sprawled cities generate more congestion externalities (distance-related
source of excessive sprawl). The emission externality not only has this distance-related
source of sprawl, but it also has “vehicle-choice-related source of excessive sprawl,” meaning
21In particular, in Appendix B, the congestion toll term is dropped from (37), and the condition for
a contradiction then becomes (38). This means that the congestion toll term has no role in the proof of
Proposition 2. To check whether emission externalities are an independent source of excessive urban sprawl
differently, we could alternatively eliminate the effect of traffic congestion by assuming that ∂I/∂Q = 0. We
can see that the proof of Proposition 2 apparently does not depend on the assumption ∂I/∂ns > 0.
22Since emission taxes alone lead to a more compact city, the model implies that emission taxes reduce
congestion externalities by reducing the suburban population, so that emission taxes can be seen as a second-
best policy for congestion externalities. Indeed, many real-world cities impose fuel taxes, while ignoring
congestion externalities, viewing fuel taxes as a substitute for congestion tolling.
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that residents in more sprawled cities use excessively less fuel-efficient vehicles than those
in more compact cities. Moreover, this vehicle-choice-related source of sprawl (separately
from the distance-related source) makes the optimal city more compact compared to the
laissez-faire city. To argue this point, we set the distance-related extra emission of suburban
vehicles (β in (17)) at unity to eliminate its effect in the proof of Proposition 2.
Another question is whether the first-best optimal city, where both kinds of externalities
are remedied by the appropriate policies, is spatially smaller than the city where only the
congestion externality is corrected by imposing the congestion toll. In effect, we are asking
whether the optimal city in the current model is more compact than the other optimal city
that the standard congested-city model yields (Arnott (1979), Wheaton (1998), Brueckner
(2007)). Since our model has an additional source of externalities (vehicle emissions), intu-
ition would suggest that the optimal city in our model should be more compact than that of
the standard congested-city model. To check whether this intuition is correct, we compare
(22) to the following expression:
v(q∗∗c )− v′(q∗∗c )q∗∗c − v(q∗∗s ) + p¯q∗∗s = −t∗∗s + t∗∗c − n∗∗s
∂I(f ∗∗s , n
∗∗
s )
∂ns
, (23)
where ∗∗ denotes the case where only the congestion externality is corrected while the emission
externality is left uncorrected. Note that there are no terms for fuel taxes but only the
congestion toll term in (23). The fuel-tax terms in (19) and (20) are also be dropped in this
case. The comparison result is given as follows:
Proposition 3 The optimal city, where both the congestion and the emission externalities
are remedied by the appropriate policies, is not necessarily smaller than the city where only
the congestion externality is corrected by optimal tolling while the emission externality is left
uncorrected.
Proof. See Appendix C.
This result suggests that when we consider a city where congestion tolling is already
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implemented, emission taxation may decrease or increase the city’s spatial size. This ambi-
guity arises due to the tension between congestion tolling and emission taxation whose effects
differ between the regimes. First note that the congestion toll term in (23) is greater than
that in (22) under ∂2I/∂f∂Q > 0 for a given ns, since fs is larger with no emission taxation
(i.e., f ∗∗s > f
∗
s ). The relative sizes of the congestion tolls are ultimately ambiguous between
the two regimes because the ns values are different, but if f choices are highly responsive
to emission taxation and the second partial derivative, ∂2I/∂f∂Q > 0, is sufficiently large,
then the congestion toll is larger at the regime ∗∗ than at ∗. The higher toll under the regime
of congestion tolling alone (∗∗) would contribute to the outcome n∗∗s < n
∗
s, setting aside the
effect of emission taxation.
But, given βNz′(E)fs > Nz′(E)fc, emission taxes imposed under the first-best regime
(∗) pull the suburban population toward the center, contributing to a smaller ns at ∗ than at
∗∗, an opposite force to the effect of congestion tolling. The overall relative sizes between n∗s
and n∗∗s depend on which force is stronger. If the effect of the higher congestion toll in (23)
outweighs the effect of emission taxes, then the higher toll pulls the suburban residents to
the central zone more strongly, yielding a more compact city at ∗∗ than at ∗, and vice versa.
The numerical examples below verify that both results are possible. This tension exists in
our model because the congestion toll depends not only on traffic flows but also on vehicle
fuel efficiency, an element that is absent in the standard congested-city models.
4 The effect of Corporate Average Fuel Economy stan-
dards
Since the choice of vehicle fuel-efficiency interacts with urban spatial structure in our
model, it implies that policies that influence vehicle choices will also influence urban spatial
structure. In this section, we analyze the effects of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
standards on urban spatial structure and its efficacy as a second-best tool for remedying the
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emission externality.
The CAFE standards regulate the average fuel economy of new vehicles sold at the
company level. So, we consider the following CAFE constraint:
ncfc + nsfs ≤ K, (24)
where K is the limit of the available f ’s, a variable set by the regulator. Recognizing that
f captures vehicle fuel-inefficiency, (24) indicates that the weighted average of fc and fs,
with the weights set at sales volumes, should be smaller than a certain level. More precisely,
dividing (24) by N would give a condition that average fuel economy of vehicles is less
than some number, but that condition would be the same as (24) with the appropriate
modification of K.23 We can see that the CAFE regulation, (24), is a modified version
of the total emission expression, (17), with 1 in place of β. This implies that the CAFE
regulation does not fully account for how much the vehicle is utilized and thus their impact
on emissions.
4.1 The equilibrium conditions under CAFE standards
Under the CAFE regime, the planner (regulator) would set the limit of available vehicle
sizes (f ’s) by choosing K while the individual consumers would choose all other variables
conditional on K. So, the framework to analyze the CAFE effect should be a mix of decen-
tralized and centralized problems.
To analyze the effect of the CAFE regulation, we exploit an intuition that the introduction
of the CAFE constraint, (24), will raise the unit price of f (capturing vehicle fuel-inefficiency)
by limiting the supply. The underlying assumptions are first, that the CAFE constraint is
23(24) is approximately equivalent to the CAFE regulation in practice, which also requires that a sales-
weighted average of fuel-efficiency (fuel-inefficiency) for the company’s vehicles be greater (smaller) than a
certain level. See EPA website (www.epa.gov/fueleconomy/regulations.htm) for how the company’s average
fuel economy is calculated. For details of CAFE regulation, its history, and policy in practice, see Anderson
et al. (2011).
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binding for vehicle producers, and second, that the incidence of the CAFE regulation falls
on consumers.24
Letting w denote the increase in the unit price of f , the central- and the suburban-
residents’ commuting costs under the CAFE regime, denoted by t˜c and t˜s, are given by
t˜c = fc + I(fc, N) + wfc, (25)
and
t˜s = 2fs + I(fs, N) + I(fs, ns) + wfs, (26)
Note that w is the increase in unit price of f , since the capital costs of purchasing a car
in both zones were normalized to zero (see footnote 10). We impose a common w value
in (25) and (26), implying that the car producer does not impose different unit prices of f
in the two zones. Allowing w values to be different may be unrealistic in that it implies
price discrimination by the car producers depending on a consumer’s place of residence.25
Note however that the price increases in levels differ by the location after all since w’s are
interacted with consumers’ vehicle choices (f) that depend on the location.
Substitution of (25) into the utility, (3), and differentiation gives the first-order condition
for fc under the CAFE regime as
1 +
∂I(fc, N)
∂fc
+ w = 0. (27)
24Regarding the market structure, it would be easy for interpretation to think of a monopolistic supplier
who considers the CAFE constraint in the production of cars. But, we could also imagine multiple producers
who jointly supply vehicles while their total production meets the CAFE constraint.
25Allowing different w values is also technically difficult in the model, because we have only one additional
equilibrium condition, (30), so we can add only one additional endogenous variable to solve the equation
system.
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In the same manner, the first-order condition for fs is given by
2 +
∂I(fs, N)
∂fs
+
∂I(fs, ns)
∂fs
+ w = 0. (28)
The first-order conditions for the q variables are the same as in the laissez-faire case. As
usual, spatial equilibrium requires equal utility across zones. Using (25) and (26), the equal-
utility condition is written
v(qc)− pcqc − t˜c = v(qs)− p¯qs − t˜s. (29)
Finally, individual choices under the CAFE regime should meet the CAFE constraint. The
CAFE constraint is assumed to be binding, since otherwise w = 0 will hold and the CAFE
regime will be equivalent to the laissez-faire equilibrium, which we rule out for relevancy of
the CAFE regulation. So, the individual choices satisfy the following equation:
(N − ns)fc + nsfs = K. (30)
The conditions consisting of (27)-(30), (5), (7), and (10) determine the equilibrium values
under the CAFE regime of the variables qc, qs, pc, ns, fc, fs, and w for a given K. So, while
the CAFE regime has an additional condition, (30), it also has an additional variable, w,
compared to the laissez-faire case.
While individuals’ choices are made conditional on K, the CAFE regulator chooses K
(the limit of available vehicle fuel-inefficiencies). The regulator’s objective is to maximize
the consumers’ aggregate utility, and the problem is written as
max
{K}
Nu = (N − ns)uc + nsus (31)
= (N − ns)
[
y − t˜c − pcqc + v(qc)− z(E)
]
+ ns
[
y − t˜s − p¯qs + v(qs)− z(E)
]
.
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As described above, the variables in (31), including E, are determined in the decentralized
setting for a given K and thus are implicit functions of K. In the numerical section below,
we compute the equilibrium values under the CAFE regulation.
Note that (31) shows a key feature of the planner’s decision in choosing K. Specifically,
there is a trade-off between the individuals’ commuting costs (t˜) and the city’s emission level
(E). When K is low, the price increase of cars will be high because of the reduction in the
available f ’s. The benefit of a low K, however, is a lower level of vehicle emissions. On the
contrary, if K is high, the price increase of cars will be limited, but the emission level will
be high. The planner balances this trade-off to maximize the total utility of the consumers.
This trade-off is illustrated in the numerical examples below. In the next section, equilibria
under CAFE as well as the other policy regimes are found using a numerical method.
5 Numerical examples
In this section, we find equilibria under various policy regimes and compare equilibrium
values across the regimes.
5.1 Finding equilibria under alternative regimes
We use I(f,Q) = b− df νQ−θ, with b > 0, d > 0, θ > 0, and 0 < ν < 1, as the functional
form for the congestion cost. The functional form for utility is u(e, q, E) = e+ qα−σE, with
σ > 0 and 0 < α < 1. Under the maintained functional forms, the first-order conditions for
the q variables are given by pc = αq
α−1
c , where qc = `/(N − ns) (` is land area of the central
zone), and qs = (p¯α
−1)
1
α−1 . While these conditions hold regardless of the policy regimes,
the key condition that distinguishes one regime from the others is the condition for ns. The
first-order conditions for f choices also differ by the policy regime.26
26Under the maintained functional form, the first-order conditions for fc and fs with emission taxation
are fc =
[
Nθ(1 +Nσ)/dν
] 1
ν−1 and fs =
[
(2 + βNσ) /dν
(
N−θ + n−θs
)] 1
ν−1 , respectively. The laissez-faire
conditions for f ’s are fc =
(
Nθ/dν
) 1
ν−1 and fs =
[
2/dν
(
N−θ + n−θs
)] 1
ν−1 , respectively.
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Let’s begin by describing the procedure finding the equilibrium under CAFE. Under the
maintained functional forms, the first-order condition for fc under CAFE, (27), is written
fc =
[
N θ(1 + w)
dν
] 1
ν−1
. (32)
and the first-order condition for fs, (28), is written
fs =
[
2 + w
dν (N−θ + n−θs )
] 1
ν−1
. (33)
As well as these conditions, the equilibrium values under CAFE also satisfy the equal-utility
condition, (29), and the CAFE constraint, (30), for a given K. To find the optimal K,
we find sets of decentralized choices with varying K values and substitute the choices into
(31) to compute the corresponding total utilities. The planner then picks the K value that
gives the maximum of the total utility, and the corresponding values are determined as the
equilibrium values.
In addition to CAFE, we can consider 5 other alternative policy regimes. The equilibrium
values in each regime are searched with adjustments to corresponding conditions. For ex-
ample, we find the equilibrium under the policy of both CAFE and congestion tolling in the
same way described above but by adding the congestion toll term to (29). We can also find
the first-best choices by using (19), (20), and (22). Note that the first-best policy imposes
both congestion tolls and emission taxes. To find the equilibrium values under the regime
of emission taxation alone, we get rid of the congestion toll term from (22) while using the
same conditions as in the first-best regime. Note that the emission taxes in this regime equal
the marginal externality costs as in the first-best regime (i.e., Nz′(E)fc and βNz′(E)fs).
The equilibrium under tolling alone satisfies condition (23) as well as (6) and (8). The con-
gestion toll in this regime is also the marginal external congestion cost, i.e., ns (∂I/∂ns),
27
27So, the toll in this regime can be thought of a first-best policy whose goal is however limited to remedy-
ing only the congestion externality. It cannot be thought of as a second-best policy that would be helpful to
remedy the emission externality since the emission level (E) under tolling alone is actually higher than under
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and its equilibrium values are searched with adjustment for the fact that emission taxes are
not imposed by finding the values satisfying (6), (8), and (23) simultaneously. Finally, the
laissez-faire choices satisfy (6), (8), and (9).
The parameter values are given as follows. The population size (N) is set at 100. The
agricultural land rent is p¯ = 0.04, and the land area of the central zone is ` = 500 (` = 1 was
used in the analytical section). The parameters in the utility function are set at α = 0.32
and σ = 0.01. The distance-related extra emission is set at β = 1.5. The parameters in the
congestion cost function are set at b = 0.4, d = 5, ν = 0.6, and θ = 0.358, and we also use
ν = 0.35 and θ = 0.7 as an alternative parameter set.
5.2 Numerical results
Let’s begin by illustrating how the equilibrium under CAFE is identified. Figure 2 shows
a graph representing the magnitudes of the total utility with varying K under the policy of
CAFE. As the figure shows, the curve is globally convex and smooth over the relevant K
values. So, we can identify the optimal K that maximizes total utility. Figure 3 shows the
total commuting cost of the city residents, (N−ns)t˜c+nst˜s, and the city’s emission level, E,
with varying values of K. These lines illustrate the trade-off faced by the CAFE regulator
in choosing the optimal K.
[Figures 2 and 3 about here]
We now focus on the effects of alternative policies on the suburban population (ns). Table
1 shows the equilibrium values under all possible combinations of the corrective policies.
We first investigate the effects of emission taxation and CAFE, i.e., the policies aimed at
correcting the emission externality, by comparing the ns values shown in columns (1), (3),
and (4). Note that we are looking at the cases where congestion tolls are not imposed
while the regimes differ only by the policy aimed at correcting the emission externality. The
laissez-faire. The emission taxes under emission taxation alone are also a first-best policy specifically target-
ing the emission externality. But, emission taxation has a second-best effect on the congestion externality
in that it reduces congestion by lowering ns.
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simulation results indicate that ns under CAFE is 63.23, which is smaller than that under
laissez-faire (68.25) but larger than that under the policy of emission taxation (60.63). We
conclude that imposition of CAFE reduces the city’s spatial size from the laissez-faire, but
not by as much as the emission taxes.
To further investigate the effects of emission taxation and CAFE on ns, we can alter-
natively compare the regimes where congestion tolling is imposed at all cases but differ by
the policy aimed at correcting the emission externality. Columns (2), (5), and (6) illustrate
such cases. We find that ns in a city where tolls and emission taxes are imposed (first-best
city) is 52.92, which is smaller than ns in a city where only tolls are imposed (54.73). The
ns value in a city where tolls and CAFE are imposed is 54.72, which is between these two
regimes.
This result, however, can be reversed depending on the parameter values. Table 2 shows
the results from the simulation using an alternative parameter set of ν = 0.35 and θ = 0.7
(while maintaining the other parameters). We find that ns in columns (6) is 48.93, which is
larger than ns in column (2) (48.77), implying that when we consider a city where congestion
tolling is already implemented, emission taxation increases the city’s spatial size. Since this
result is opposite to that in Table 1, it confirms the ambiguous result shown in Proposition 3.
As explained above, this ambiguity arises due to the tension between congestion tolling and
emission taxation whose effects differ between the regimes. Specifically, in both tables, the
toll value under the policy of tolling alone (in column (2)) is greater than that under the first-
best policy (in column (6)). In Table 1, the difference in the toll values between the regimes,
i.e., the gap in ns (∂I/∂ns) between the two columns, is 0.12, while the difference in the
emission taxes between the suburban and the central residents, i.e, βNz′(E)f ∗s −Nz′(E)f ∗c ,
is 0.08. The ratio of these numbers is 1.5 (= 0.12/0.08). The outcome n∗s < n
∗∗
s in Table 1
suggests that the force generated by the gap in the congestion tolls does not outweigh the
force generated by emission taxation. The same kind of ratio calculated from Table 2 is 1.6,
which is larger than that in Table 1 and thus regarded as a source of the outcome n∗s > n
∗∗
s
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in Table 2. Simulations with other parameter sets show that as the ratio computed in this
way gets higher, n∗s > n
∗∗
s is more likely to emerge.
[Tables 1 and 2 about here]
The effects of congestion tolling on ns are also consistent with the theoretical predictions.
Table 1 shows that the ns value in column (2) is 54.73, which is smaller than that in column
(1) (68.25), meaning that congestion tolling reduces the city’s spatial size from the laissez-
faire. To further investigate the effect of tolling, we can alternatively compare the ns values
in columns (4) and (6), where emission taxes are imposed in both cases. We can also compare
columns (3) and (5), where the CAFE standards are imposed in both cases. Regardless of
the comparison frame, the city shrinks spatially in response to imposition of tolling.
We now compare welfare across the alternative policy regimes. The welfare measure we
use is the consumers’ total utility plus rebates of congestion toll revenue, emission tax rev-
enue, CAFE revenue, and total land rents paid to absentee landlords.28 The consumer utility
is computed by substituting the equilibrium values to the utility function ex post charge of
the corrective policies. This implies that the revenues from the corrective policies must be
included in the welfare measure as they can potentially be paid back to the consumers. Note
in particular that the CAFE revenue, which equals (N − ns)fcw + nsfsw, is included in
the welfare since it captures the increased vehicle revenue due to the price increase under
CAFE and therefore is a benefit to somebody.29 The last row in Table 1 shows the welfare
calculated in this way. As expected, the first-best regime imposing both tolls and emission
taxes yields the highest welfare while the laissez-faire yields the lowest welfare. The CAFE
standards increase welfare from the laissez-faire, but not by as much as the emission taxes.
As expected, imposition of congestion tolling increases the city’s welfare. The simulation
28Note that rent per unit of land in the suburban zone is fixed at p¯. Since the land area of the suburban
zone (used either for agriculture or for rental to urban residents) is also fixed, its land value is not affected
by the policies. So, the welfare measure includes only the land value of the central zone, which equals
pcqc(N − ns).
29In this remark, we are implicitly ignoring costs incurred by the supply side, which is suppressed in our
model. Without inclusion of the CAFE revenue, the welfare under CAFE alone is 138.26 and that under both
CAFE and congestion tolling is 139.25. So, conclusions we draw from the welfare comparison are unchanged
with or without inclusion of the CAFE revenue.
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result shown in Table 2 verifies that these results are robust to variations in parameter values.
We can also compare values for other endogenous variables across the alternative regimes.
For example, vehicle sizes are smaller under the policy of emission taxation than under
laissez-faire (see the f values in columns (1) and (4)). The fs value under the first-best
policy is also smaller than that under laissez-faire (see columns (1) and (6)), which clears up
the ambiguity shown in Proposition 2.30 But, imposition of tolling increases the fs size from
the laissez-faire, confirming the result of Proposition 1 (see columns (1) and (2)). The effects
of CAFE on f sizes depend on the magnitude of w (increase in unit price of f). According
to Table 1, w is 1.14, which is between the emission tax per fc (= 1) and that per fs (= 1.5).
Consequently, the fc value is smaller under CAFE than under emission taxation while fs is
larger under CAFE than under emission taxation (see columns (3) and (4)). The tables also
present other endogenous variables, such as the city’s emission levels whose relative sizes are
consistent with the theory.
6 Conclusion
There have been growing concerns about the potential influences of urban sprawl on
the environment, especially on greenhouse gas emissions. Few urban economic models have
analyzed this issue, presumably because of the lack of a reliable way of representing the
city’s total emission amount. We overcome this challenge by treating consumers’ vehicle
fuel-efficiency choices endogenously. The analysis shows that under the presence of both
congestion and emission externalities, a city without appropriate corrective policies is too
spread out compared to the socially optimal city. While this result is the same as in the
standard congested-city models that abstract from the emission externality, it is shown that
the source of this outcome is different and includes the use of larger and less fuel-efficient
vehicles in more sprawled cities.
30This result implies that the effect of emission taxation on fs outweighs the effect of congestion tolling
that operates in the opposite direction. This result is natural because while emission taxes are imposed
directly on vehicle sizes, congestion tolling influences fs via ns and therefore its effect is indirect.
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Congestion pricing is uncommon in the US, and the rate of US fuel taxes is relatively
low not only compared to the socially desirable level but also by international standards
(Parry et al. (2007), Small (2010), Glaeser (2011)). Based on our model, the failure to
implement the first-best policies in the US means that the US cities are too spread out,
justifying criticisms of urban sprawl. However, land-use restrictions such as urban growth
boundaries, while potentially appealing as anti-sprawl policies, are inefficient alternatives
to congestion pricing and higher fuel taxes (Brueckner (2007), Anas and Pines (2008)).
This paper additionally analyzes the CAFE standards as an alternative second-best tool for
correcting emission externalities and restricting excessive growth of urban areas. While the
CAFE regulation potentially improves the welfare of the city residents by making the choice
of less fuel-efficient cars more costly, the analysis shows that it is nevertheless limited in
its ability to charge properly for the external costs involved in the choices of vehicles and
residential locations.
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A The effect of an increase in N on f
For comparative static derivation, differentiation of (8) with respect to N gives
∂2I(fs, N)
∂f 2s
∂fs
∂N
+
∂2I(fs, N)
∂fs∂N
+
∂2I(fs, ns)
∂f 2s
∂fs
∂N
+
∂2I(fs, ns)
∂fs∂ns
∂ns
∂N
= 0, (34)
and rearrangement yields
∂fs
∂N
= −
(
∂2I(fs, N)
∂fs∂N
+
∂2I(fs, ns)
∂fs∂ns
∂ns
∂N
)(
∂2I(fs, N)
∂f 2s
+
∂2I(fs, ns)
∂f 2s
)−1
< 0, (35)
given ∂2I/∂f∂Q > 0 and ∂2I/∂f 2 > 0 and ∂ns/∂N ≥ 0. We rule out an implausible case
of ∂ns/∂N < 0 (or ∂nc/∂N > 1), which implies some ex-ante suburban population migrate
into the central zone in response to the increase in N . Differentiation of (6) with respect to
N and rearrangement yields
∂fc
∂N
= −
(
∂2I(fc, N)
∂fc∂N
)(
∂2I(fc, N)
∂f 2c
)−1
< 0, (36)
where the sign is determined by ∂2I/∂f∂Q > 0 and ∂2I/∂f 2 > 0.
B Proof of Proposition 2
We begin by showing the relative sizes of fc values. Note first that
∂I(f∗c ,N)
∂fc
< ∂I(f̂c,N)
∂fc
holds from (6) and (19). This inequality implies f ∗c < f̂c given ∂
2I/∂f 2 > 0.
Next, to show n∗s < n̂s, suppose n
∗
s ≥ n̂s. Then, q∗c ≥ q̂c holds given ns = N − 1/qc. Since
v(q)− v′(q)q is increasing in q, the LHS of (22) is greater than (or equal to) the LHS of (16),
given q∗c ≥ q̂c and q∗s = q̂s. So, the RHS of (22) must also be greater than (or equal to) the
RHS of (16), or equivalently the following must hold:
−Nz′(E∗)(−f ∗c + βf ∗s ) ≥ (t̂c − t∗c)− (t̂s − t∗s) + n∗s
∂I(f ∗s , n
∗
s)
∂ns
. (37)
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To show a contradiction of n∗s ≥ n̂s, we can show (37) does not hold. But, it is sufficient for
establishment of a contradiction of n∗s ≥ n̂s to show the following:
−Nz′(E∗)(−f ∗c + f ∗s ) ≤ (t̂c − t∗c)− (t̂s − t∗s), (38)
since the addition of n∗s
∂I(f∗s ,n∗s)
∂ns
> 0 to the RHS of (38) wouldn’t change the inequality
when (38) holds. Also, β in (37) is set at unity since allowing β > 1 would not change
the inequality in (38) when (38) holds. In other words, (38) is a sufficient condition for a
contradiction of n∗s ≥ n̂s. So, we prove n∗s < n̂s by showing (38) under n∗s ≥ n̂s.
The second term on the RHS of (38) is written
t̂s − t∗s = δ(f̂s − f ∗s ), (39)
where δ satisfies
−Nz′(E∗) ≤ δ ≡ t̂s − t
∗
s
f̂s − f ∗s
≤ 0. (40)
To see (39) holds, note first that ∂ts/∂f evaluated at f
∗
s equals −Nz′(E∗) from (20) while
the derivative evaluated at f̂s equals zero from (8). Since the relationship between ts and
f is convex, so that the derivative is monotonic, the change in ts (i.e., t̂s − t∗s) equals the
change in f times a value intermediate between the derivatives at the starting and ending f
values, a number that therefore lies between −Nz′(E∗) and 0. In the same manner, the first
term on the RHS of (38) is written
t̂c − t∗c = γ(f̂c − f ∗c ), (41)
where −Nz′(E∗) ≤ γ ≤ 0 holds for the same reason as (40).
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Using (39) and (41), the condition for a contradiction, (38), is rewritten
−f ∗c + f ∗s ≥ −
1
Nz′(E∗)
[
(t̂c − t∗c)− (t̂s − t∗s)
]
= − 1
Nz′(E∗)
[
γ(f̂c − f ∗c )− δ(f̂s − f ∗s )
]
= − δ
Nz′(E∗)
[γ
δ
(f̂c − f ∗c )− (f̂s − f ∗s )
]
. (42)
Since 0 ≤ − δ
Nz′(E∗) ≤ 1 from (40), the sufficient condition for a contradiction, i.e., (42)
equivalent to (38), reduces to
−f ∗c + f ∗s ≥
γ
δ
(f̂c − f ∗c )− (f̂s − f ∗s ) (43)
⇐⇒ 0 ≥ f̂c − f̂s +
(
1− γ
δ
)
(f ∗c − f̂c). (44)
The reason is that if (43) holds, then the fact that the RHS of (43) is larger than the RHS
(42) (given 0 ≤ − δ
Nz′(E∗) ≤ 1) will establish that (42) is satisfied. If the RHS of (43) is
negative, (43) is always satisfied since −f ∗c + f ∗s > 0 (see footnote 20). (43) is manipulated
to yield (44), where we have f̂c− f̂s < 0 and f ∗c − f̂c < 0. It is also shown below that 1− γδ ≥ 0
(⇔ δ ≤ γ ≤ 0) holds, so that (44) or equivalently (43) is satisfied.
Here, we check δ ≤ γ, which means that the change in ts is greater (in absolute value)
than that in tc when f changes from the optimal value to the laissez-faire value. Setting
f̂c = f̂s ≡ f̂ (which is possible since we are comparing the changes in t), we write
∂ts
∂f
− ∂tc
∂f
=
(
2 +
∂I(f,N)
∂f
+
∂I(f, ns)
∂f
)
−
(
1 +
∂I(f,N)
∂f
)
= 1 +
∂I(f, ns)
∂f
< 0, ∀ f < f̂ . (45)
The inequality in (45) is shown by noting that tc is decreasing with fc over the
[
f ∗c , f̂c
]
interval, so that 1 + ∂I(f,N)
∂f
< 0, and this inequality implies 1 + ∂I(f,ns)
∂f
< 0 since ∂I(f,N)
∂f
>
∂I(f,ns)
∂f
holds given ∂2I/∂f∂Q > 0. From ∂ts
∂f
< ∂tc
∂f
(see (45)), δ ≤ γ follows, establishing
39
(44).
The sufficient condition for a contradiction, (42) (equivalently (38)), is then established.
Hence, n∗s ≥ n̂s is contradictory, so that n∗s < n̂s. Under n∗s < n̂s, q∗c < q̂c holds given
ns = N − 1/qc, and p∗c > p̂c follows given v′(qc) = pc and v′′ < 0.
We finally show both f ∗s ≤ f̂s and f ∗s > f̂s are possible under n∗s < n̂s. Note first that (8)
and (20) imply, given Nz′(E∗) > 0,
∂I(f ∗s , N)
∂fs
+
∂I(f ∗s , n
∗
s)
∂fs
<
∂I(f̂s, N)
∂fs
+
∂I(f̂s, n̂s)
∂fs
. (46)
(46) is satisfied when f ∗s ≤ f̂s, since both ∂I(f
∗
s ,N)
∂fs
< ∂I(f̂s,N)
∂fs
and ∂I(f
∗
s ,n
∗
s)
∂fs
< ∂I(f̂s,n̂s)
∂fs
then
hold under n∗s < n̂s. However, (46) can still be satisfied even when f
∗
s > f̂s, because
∂I(f∗s ,n∗s)
∂fs
< ∂I(f̂s,n̂s)
∂fs
is still possible under n∗s < n̂s, so that a contradiction of f
∗
s > f̂s is not
established. So, we cannot rule out the f ∗s > f̂s outcome, and therefore the relative sizes of
fs values are ambiguous.
C Proof of Proposition 3
Following the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 2, to show n∗s < n
∗∗
s , we have to
establish a condition for a contradiction of n∗s ≥ n∗∗s , which is written
−Nz′(E∗)(−f ∗c + βf ∗s ) ≤ (t∗∗c − t∗c)− (t∗∗s − t∗s)− n∗∗s
∂I(f ∗∗s , n
∗∗
s )
∂ns
+ n∗s
∂I(f ∗s , n
∗
s)
∂ns
. (47)
However, (47) may or may not hold under n∗s ≥ n∗∗s . Note first that f ∗s < f ∗∗s holds under
n∗s ≥ n∗∗s (the proof of this remark is the same as in Proposition 2). Then, given n∗s ≥ n∗∗s
and ∂2I/∂f∂Q > 0, the relative sizes of ns
∂I(fs,ns)
∂ns
values are ambiguous between the ∗ and
the ∗∗ cases, and thus (47) may not hold. Hence, we cannot establish a contradiction of
n∗s ≥ n∗∗s . Since this result does not rule out n∗s < n∗∗s either, the relative sizes of ns values
are ambiguous. The ambiguities in the relative sizes in qc and pc values then follow.
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Table 1: Equilibrium values under alternative regimes (with ν = 0.6 and θ = 0.358)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Laissez-faire Toll alone CAFE alone Emission tax Toll & CAFE Toll &
alone Emission tax
Congestion toll No Yes No No Yes Yes
Emission tax No No No Yes No Yes
CAFE No No Yes No Yes No
ns 68.25 54.73 63.23 60.63 54.72 52.92
qc 15.75 11.04 13.60 12.70 11.04 10.62
pc 0.0491 0.0625 0.0542 0.0568 0.0625 0.0642
fc 0.2528 0.2528 0.0377 0.0447 0.0295 0.0447
fs 0.3017 0.3359 0.1013 0.0789 0.0918 0.0843
Nz′(E)fc (Emission tax in c) NA NA NA 0.0447 NA 0.0447
βNz′(E)fs (Emission tax in s) NA NA NA 0.1183 NA 0.1265
wfc (Increased commuting cost in c) NA NA 0.0430 NA 0.0402 NA
wfs (Increased commuting cost in s) NA NA 0.1155 NA 0.1249 NA
ns (∂I/∂ns) (Toll) NA 0.2220 NA NA 0.1020 0.0980
E (Total emission) 38.91 39.02 11.00 8.93 8.88 8.80
Welfare 126.78 127.89 147.15 147.74 147.91 148.07
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Table 2: Equilibrium values under alternative regimes (with ν = 0.35 and θ = 0.7)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Laissez-faire Toll alone CAFE alone Emission tax Toll & CAFE Toll &
alone Emission tax
Congestion toll No Yes No No Yes Yes
Emission tax No No No Yes No Yes
CAFE No No Yes No Yes No
ns 54.73 48.77 54.63 53.51 49.08 48.93
qc 11.05 9.76 11.02 10.76 9.82 9.79
pc 0.0625 0.0680 0.0626 0.0636 0.0677 0.0678
fc 0.0166 0.0166 0.0134 0.0057 0.0080 0.0057
fs 0.0238 0.0256 0.0213 0.0102 0.0169 0.0108
Nz′(E)fc (Emission tax in c) NA NA NA 0.0057 NA 0.0057
βNz′(E)fs (Emission tax in s) NA NA NA 0.0153 NA 0.0162
wfc (Increased commuting cost in c) NA NA 0.0020 NA 0.0049 NA
wfs (Increased commuting cost in s) NA NA 0.0032 NA 0.0103 NA
ns (∂I/∂ns) (Toll) NA 0.0639 NA NA 0.0550 0.0471
E (Total emission) 2.70 2.73 2.35 1.08 1.65 1.09
Welfare 138.29 138.43 138.62 139.36 139.28 139.46
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CBD Central Zone Suburban Zone Undeveloped
Land
Central bridge Suburban bridge
Figure 1: Regional Map
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Figure 2: Total utility as a function of K
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Figure 3: Total commuting cost and total emission as a function of K
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